In a few hours time, the House of Commons will vote on the following motion, tabled by the SNP and Plaid Cymru and backed by the Liberal Democrats.
That this House believes that there should be a select committee of seven honourable Members, being members of Her Majesty's Privy Council, to review the way in which the responsibilities of Government were discharged in relation to Iraq and all matters relevant thereto, in the period leading up to military action in that country in March 2003 and in its aftermath.
I hope they get it. Because contrary to what the Government maintains, the Hutton Inquiry and the Butler Inquiry were not enough. They failed to nail the real responsibility for the lies and deceptions that resulted in us going to war on a false prospectus, or to establish the extent of the Blair Government's culpability in failing to plan for the post-war aftermath.
If anyone still believes that Tony Blair did not know that intelligence was being fixed to fit a predetermined policy of regime change, or that he was unaware of the total lack of a reconstruction plan, they should read THIS.
4 comments:
Paul, I do believe it is the time to have a full debate about Iraq, but I fear it will not happen, I have just been told by a blogger in Turkey that the Government saw off the motion. How is Blair so lucky?
Because he has the devil on his side...
Of course he knew, Paul but as said to Ellee, there's not a whole lot that can be done, particularly as he scraped in on the vote. Then again, perhaps it should be held off until after the troops return, which won't happen in the near future because of the agenda and therefore, as he's leaving office anyway, he's got off scott free! But you're closer to the action than I am.
While I back an inquiry, I don't think now is the right time. We need to look back at the events once we are out of the country and then sort out what happened.
The sickest irony is that there WAS a reconstruction plan prepared by the State Department over more than a decade and kept on ice for the eventuality of an invasion. It was a half-decent one too, that focussed on restoring services and reconstruction. Sadly, Rumsfeld refused to countenance it - they believed that the US troops would be welcomed as liberators and would be able to leave swiftly. Insufficient force was put on the ground to provide security and the leaders and managers who knew how the country worked were sacked from their jobs in a hell-for-leather de-Baathification policy, which only meant that nobody knew how to do things and there were thousands of motivated opponents to the new regime.
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